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Abstract—IEC61850 and IEC62351 combined provide a set
of security promises for the communications channels that are
used to run a substation automation system (SAS), that use
IEC61850 based technologies. However, one area that is largely
untouched by these security promises is the generic object
oriented substation events (GOOSE) messaging service. GOOSE
is designed to multicast commands and data across a substation
within hard real time quality of service (QoS) requirements.
This means that GOOSE is unable to implement the required
security technologies as the added latency to any message would
violate the QoS.
The focus of the security research into the GOOSE messaging
service has been on how it can be used to undermine IEC61850’s
security promise of availability, but these attacks will be detected
in time. Given GOOSE’s lack of security it is likely that the
messaging service will be used to propagate a small number
of messages to force the SAS to perform undesired actions,
whilst avoiding undermining availability. It appears none of the
analysis into GOOSE’s security has considered this.
This analysis looks to find the minimum parameters that an
adversary would have to fulfil, and probability of success, to
inject a single malicious message into a intelligent electronic
device (IED). This work develops a model for calculating the
likelihood a malicious message will be successfully injected
given a rate message injection, using a single M/M/1/K queue.
It then uses this model to test the effectiveness of various
countermeasures, such as a message buffer, rate limiting,
a threshold of the number of malicious messages in the
required for detection, and stringent enforcement of the QoS
requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the smart grid (SG) design paradigm
for the operation of electrical grids degrades the air
gap security principle that has been used by the energy
sector for the past few decades. The guiding principle
of security through obscurity of supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) protocols is no longer tenable,
as their communications networks begin to interact with
internet technologies. Whilst both the academic and industrial
research communities are now focusing on solving the unique
security challenges created by using SG technologies, bespoke
attacks against SG networks have already begun to emerge
in the wild. In December 2016 the Ukrainian power grid
was affected by the malware ’CRASHOVERRIDE’, which
proceed to deliver a payload that shut off a transmission
substation[1]. The analysis of the malware showed that it
was not only designed to undermine the security and QoS
promises of the IEC60870 and IEC61850 SAS protocols,
but use the authors detailed understanding of the protocols
to use specific logical nodes (LN) to cause damage to the
distribution network. A way of counteracting these threats is
to develop secured communications standards that undermine
a malicious actor’s ability to gain a foothold in the network.
The GOOSE messaging service is one of the two models
within IEC61850 that enables multicast association of devices
in a substation. It is designed as a fast and reliable messaging
system to distribute time critical data and commands to the
relevant IEDs, such as commands to activate the substation’s
protection equipment. Due to the hard real time constraints
(3− 4ms) and high level of reliability of all the messages the
GOOSE messaging service is designed to be non-routeable,
an entire message sent in a single packet, and received
without acknowledgement. A GOOSE message is multicast
across the substation’s network using a publish-subscribe
model, so different subscribers can be reached for different
calibrated events[2].
The only security promises that the GOOSE messaging
service must uphold are availability and integrity from
transmission error. The standard does add that the GOOSE
subscribers must be able to detect and dispose of duplicate
messages. Whilst the IEC62351 does integrate traditional
security promises into the IEC61850 standard, it explicitly
does not add them to GOOSE. It declares “for applications
using GOOSE and IEC 61850-9-2 and requiring 4ms
response times, multicast configurations, and low CPU
overhead, encryption is not recommended”[3]. This is due
to the added latency of encrypting or digitally signing a
GOOSE message using current IED hardware would violate
the time constraints of the QoS promises[4]. The only
security feature that IEC62351 adds to GOOSE messaging
serivce is a replay protection algorithm[3]. The IEC61850
and IEC62351 make no considerations for the other specific
security problems faced by multicast protocols, which will
be covered in section II. These are access control or group
address obfuscation mechanisms. Having a policy on this
would hinder an adversary’s attempt to used the GOOSE
service as an attack vector with which they could map and
manipulate the communications network.
The combination of the lack of acknowledgement of
message reciept and limited security protection makes
the GOOSE service an ideal attack vector against an SG
communications network. For this reason GOOSE has been
one of the few models within IEC61850 that has been
probed by the research community for vulnerabilities (an
analysis will be provided in section II). The main focus of
GOOSE attack research has been attacks against availability
of devices, to prevent critical messages from being received,
as well as easily propagated across the network due to
multicast messaging services usually having a high workflow
amplification factors[5]. However, there seems to have been
no consideration about whether the service is susceptible to
injection class attacks.
This analysis will describe the minimum necessary conditions
that an adversary must meet for their injection attack to be
successful, and remain undetected, given the stringent QoS
time constraints of the GOOSE service. The objective of the
adversary in this analysis is that they wish to achieve their
disruption with only a few messages, instead of denying
availability. It then goes on to demonstrate the effectiveness of
this attack vector and consideration various counter measures.
It is shown that rate limiting and having a small message
buffer decreases the chance of a successful injection. Strict
enforcement of the message arrival QoS is also discussed,
but it is shown that it opens up another attack vector to be
exploited.
The analysis, in section IV, is done using a model generated
in the authors’ queueing theory framework[6], which
uses a M/M/1/K queue. This framework is designed to
model protocol semantic attacks against availability and
de-synchronisation. The analysis uses some of the features of
the framework, which are described in section III, to model
messages entering an IED’s communication channel.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews the current state of the art of multicast
and GOOSE security, as well as the use of queuing theory in
security research.
There are taxonomies for the specific security considerations
of a multicast system. Judge et al.[7] laid out the the three
multicast features that require specific security considerations.
They are that all group members receive the same message,
the group membership is transparent to the source, and the
source of a message doesn’t have to be a member of the
group. This taxonomy then goes on to proposing a series
of solutions to negate each attack vector. Canetti et al.[8]
discussed several of the security issues facing multicast
technology, and then propose a solution for securing the
source and message authentication. Their scheme was for
each sender to hold a collection of keys, and each recipient
held a subset of those. Their specific subset of the keys would
allow them to authenticate the specific sender of a message.
Research into the security of the GOOSE messaging
service is focused on what malicious actions an adversary
can do within the rules of the service. Most of the attacks
discussed below are done with the inclusion of, and sometimes
caused by, the replay attack protection of IEC62351. Hoyos
et al.[9] demonstrated a GOOSE spoofing attack where the
adversary injects malicious copies of legitimate message,
with an incremented stNum, the GOOSE variable the
counts the number of events that have occured, to force the
IED to ignore some of the future messages it will receive.
They also flip any Boolean data in the transmitted DatSet.
The aim of their attack is to get an IED to perform an
undesirable action, such as ignoring a command to trip a
circuit breaker, by providing it with incorrect information.
Strobel et al.[10] qualitatively expand upon Hoyos’ attack
vector by discussing that if an adversary replayed a GOOSE
message within two minutes of a stNum rollover, after 232
events the stNum counter resets, they can undermine the
availability promise of an IED for up to approximately 4.5
years, presuming no one notices. Whilst Kush et al.[11] also
model an attack against availability by using a near rollover
stNum, they model two other attacks. In the first attack
the adversary floods a GOOSE subscriber with messages
that have incrementally higher stNum until they exceed
the current value, and the second attack sees the adversary
injecting malicious messages, with a marginally higher
stNum, at a slightly higher rate than the regular messages.
Whilst not developing an explicit adversary model El Hariri et
al.[12] do explore an important consideration for the security
of the GOOSE protocols whose QoS requirements demand
that devices from different manufactures be interoperable.
They demonstrate that different commercial devices and
simulation libraries respond differently when presented with
the same undesirable situations. The various implementations
had differing responses with messages with old timestamps,
and out of order sTNum, but with timestamps outside the 2
minute skew of the IEC62351 replay prevention algorithm.
The main use of queing theory formalism in the security
domain has been to describe denial of service (DoS) attacks.
It is a suitable formalism for this type of attack as DoS
scenarios can be modeled without much abstraction. This is
due to how queuing theory calculates the efficency of a series
of objects being processed in a queue according to a specific
set of rules. These rules can easily be mapped to represent





Fig. 1. A queue representing an IED with a message buffer (K) of 6, with 5
messages in the buffer. It has both regular and malicious traffic coming into
it, but they are both processed at the same rate.
a processor with a specific memory allocation. Despite this
natural affinity, seemingly little research has been persued in
the modelling DoS attacks using queuing theory. Most of the
research describes various packet level scenarios with either
a single M/M/1 queue or an open Jackson network, which
is a network of M/M/1 queues. Relying on M/M/1 limits
what the user can discern from their models, as a queue
of this type can hold an infinite number of objects. Given
this underlying assumption, all that can be discerned from
these models is the degradation of the queues performance. It
doesn’t tell the user at what point the system being modelled
will fail to meet its promise of avaliability. However, Xiao-Yu
et al.[13] does use a M/M/c/K queue to investigate SIP
INVITE request flooding scenario. Their solution is to create
a queue that deals only with INVITE requests. Kammas et
al.[14] created an open Jackson network of M/M/1 queues
to model virus propagation across a network. Their state
space included the internal transitions of state of each node,
as well as the global state of the network. Wang et al.[15]
developed a mathematical framework, using embedded two
dimensional Markov chains, to allow the user to use different
probability distribution functions for acceptance rates. Their
model also allows for the separate analysis of the malicious
message properties from the normal traffic’s.
III. QUEUING THEORY FRAMEWORK
For the models used to demonstrate the attacks a single
M/M/1/K queue is used[16], as shown in Fig.1, which
can receive two different types of messages. The M/M/1/K
queue is used for this model because having a limit on the
maximum number of messages in the queue puts an upper
ceiling on the adversaries injection rate. If their injection rate is
too high then they will end up denying any legitimate messages
into the IED, which undermines their goals. In this model the
two messages are the regular traffic and the malicious traffic
injected into the channel. For the purposes of this analysis the
single queue maps to a single communications channel of a
subscriber that is within a GOOSE multicast group. The model
assumes:-
1) Each queue obeys the first-in-first-out (FIFO) discipline
for processing messages.
2) The processing time, µ, of the different types of mes-
sages are each assumed to follow an exponential dis-
tribution. However, the effective probability distribution
describing the rate at which messages pass through a
queue isn’t an exponential distribution.
3) That the transition between states is memoryless.
The state space of the models represents the position of the
different messages within the queue,
I = {(1, ...,K) ∈ {n,m, ∅}} (1)
where K is maximum number of messages in the queue. Each
position in the queue can either regular, malicious, or empty,
but there cannot be an empty space between two messages.
The two types of transitions that can occur within this model
are:
• A message entering the queue at a rate of γreg or γmal.
• A message being processed by the queue with a rate of
µreg or µmal.
With the above rules the endogenous variables for the queue
can be calculated with:
Variable Equation
Probability of being full P (N = K) = (1−ρ)ρ
K
1−ρK+1
Arrival rate λ = γreg + γmal
Processing rate µ = µreg + µmal
where ρi = λµ .
The arrival and processing rates are governed by assumption 2.
Once a state transition matrix has been generated and solved,
presuming the system is in a steady state, for the queue, a
probabilistic view of the state space can be calculated. The
view for this state space is the probability of that a particular
type of message is in specific position in the queue




To further the understanding of the injection attack they’re two
additional views which are calculated in the same way. These
views are the probability that there is only one a malicious
message in the queue, and it is at the front of the queue, and
there is a malicious message at the front of the queue with
the number of malicious messages in the queue being below
a certain threshold.
The standard queuing theory performance metrics are used in
this analysis are:
Performance Metric Equation
Mean Number of messages k¯ =
∑k
k=1 kpi(k)
Mean Response Time T¯ = k¯λ
IV. INJECTION ATTACKS
As stated in section II the research into attacks using the
GOOSE message service focuses on seeing what capabilities
the adversary can have due to the rules of the GOOSE
model, but they don’t discuss how the adversary achieved
their foothold (since the security of the service is trivial
to overcome). They also do not discuss how likely these
attacks would be detected. If the adversary’s goal is undermine
availability completely, then it will be detected eventually.
However, for an adversary that only wants to disrupt a few
messages it is likely that they wish for their actions to remain
unnoticed by any intrusion detection system (IDS). None of
the above works have commented on this particular use case,
or how likely it is.
The following section will provide an analysis of the minimum
adversarial capabilities required to inject a single malicious
message. This injected message may be us to disrupt a few
superseding messages or make the SAS perform an undesir-
able action, without undermining the promise of availability
within the security network.
A. Message Injection Attack
For Strobel’s DoS attack to succeed the adversary must
time the injection of their malicious message correctly or they
will have to wait around for another 4 years for the stNum
to rollover. Whilst Strobel gives the upper timing bound of
the injection within two minutes of the rollover to pass the
replay detection algorithm, they provide no consideration
to the rate of injection needed for the attack to deny any
messages after the rollover has happened. The analysis picks
up from here and discusses likelihood of this kind of attack.
Using this starting point an adversary model can be
developed for when they wish to complete their objective
using only one message. For this attack to work the adversary
will be required to have performed some passive surveillance
of the target subscriber IED. This is so they can discover
what the current stNum is, and the rate at which they
change. Whilst it is not necessary for the adversary to obey
Kerckhoffs’ principles[17], they must at least know that
the GOOSE stNum rollover occurs when it reaches 232
and that they have to complete their injection within two
minutes. Finally, they must be able to manipulate the rate
of transmission of individual messages. First to delay their
arrival, before accelerating it so it can be injected at the
desired time.
If it is assumed that the subscriber’s channel has no buffer of
messages it receives, then the chances of adversary’s malicious
message being the first message they logarithmically with the
increase in the rate of injection. This is shown in Fig.2, which
shows that the adversary needs to be of order hundred times
faster than the normal injection rate to guarantee their success.
B. Countermeasures: Message Buffer and Rate Limiting
By introducing even a small buffer of messages then the
probability of the malicious message being first drops to
below 12 . Adjusting the adversary model to allow for message
duplicates to be injected, does not increase their probability of
success greatly if they wish to maintain the objective of not
DoSing the buffer with malicious messages. Another method
of limiting the success of the adversary is by limiting the
range of injection rates that will be accepted by the subscriber.
These two methodologies are demonstrated in Fig.3, where
Fig. 2. The probability of success of an injection, given the ratio of regular






Fig. 3. The probability of success of an injection, given the ratio of regular





. There is a message buffer and
a injection rate limit of only being ten times faster than regular traffic.
the buffer is only five messages long, and the threshold of
detection is two or more.
C. Countermeasure: Evasion of buffers & rate limitation and
Implementing Inflexible QoS
In the above analysis it is presumed that the malicious
message is the same size as the regular traffic. However, if an
adversary gains the ability to edit and increase the number of
data sets in the GOOSE message it can be shown that they
may be able to circumvent the above the countermeasures. In
this attack the adversary model is expanded so that they can
intercept and edit a GOOSE message. The knowledge that
they require is knowledge of the upper limit of size of the
DatSet that a GOOSE message can carry without tripping the
Fig. 4. The probability of success of an injection, given the ratio of regular





, given a message buffer, when








Fig. 5. The layout of the attack against a tap changer, when QoS is strictly
enforced. Where T0 & T1 are different QoS time requirements defined in
IEC61850-5[18]. An ’event’ is a new event that causes the GOOSE publisher
to start a new stNum.
integrity check. As shown in Fig.4, contrary to the previous
section, the optimal rate of injection to evade the discussed
countermeasures with the enlarged message is slower than
the regular rate of injection. This means for the evasion to be
successful the adversary would also be required to do some
passive surveillance to observe the rate of arrival of regular
messages so they could time their injection correctly. Whilst
this attack vector doesn’t increase the adversary’s odds of
remaining undetected, it does increase the chance of their
injected message being first. A counter measure to the above
attack vector would to have more stringent enforcement on
the QoS transmission standard. Currently IEC61850 standard
still allows for messages that arrive late to be processed.
If the standard tightened this QoS promise, there would be
no guarantee that publishers message could get through.
An adversary would manipulate this counter measure, using
the previously stated adversary model, to invalidate a single
GOOSE event in a sequence of GOOSE events. That is to say
that a stNum is changed without any time for retransmission
between the change. An example of this would be in the
issuance of tap changer commands[19]. The commands to
adjust come in a succession of GOOSE messages, as shown
in Fig.5,and if the tap does not end in the correct position it
is likely to damage the physical equipment. Fig.6 shows that
a less than one order of magnitude increase in the size of the
GOOSE message can create a greater delay in the expected
Fig. 6. A demonstration of the increased processing time when enlarging
a malicious message in relation to regular traffic. The x-axis is the ratio of






processing time of messages. All the variables in Fig.6 are
set to the same, and only µmal is increased in relation to
µnorm. This delay would make subsequent messages miss
their QoS permitted window.
This look at the stricter enforcement of QoS presumes that
there is no change in the order of magnitude between the
translation of a change in the size of the message and the
time it takes to process a message. The change in size is
demonstrated in the queueing theory model as an increase
in time of processing of the malicious message, which has
now been uncoupled from the processing rate of regular traffic.
A counter measure that would help prevent the adversary’s
subversion of the rate limiter, would be to bind the ConfRev
variable with the DatSet. If the number of data sets changes
but doesn’t have a corresponding event then the IED disposes
of it in the integrity check. This would undermine the
adversary being able to increase the size of the GOOSE
message.
V. CONCLUSION
The above analysis describes the minimum capabilities an
an adversary needs to inject a single message to cause the
GOOSE messaging service to perform undesirable actions
using a M/M/1/K queue. The analysis goes on to look
at the effectiveness of different countermeasures to attack
vector. These were creating a message buffer for the GOOSE
communication channel, rate limiting the arrival of messages
and binding the GOOSE message ConfRev variable with
the message size, so it can be used for integrity checking.
For these countermeasures to be effective they should be
implemented at the standard level, because if they are left
to for implementers level there is no guarantee that the
parameters of the countermeasures will be the same. A
difference in countermeasures parameters may provide an
adversary with new attack vectors to exploit the GOOSE
messaging service.
Despite the assumptions built into the model, such as
the lack of transience in the message arrival rate distribution,
it does provide a benchmark for those developing IDS
systems for the GOOSE service. It can be used to show
the probability of injection success given a threshold of the
number of malicious messages in the buffer required for
detection. Alongside this, the model can be used to calculate
the injection probability against other protocols. It would
require the user to input the QoS requirements from other
standard.
The future direction of this work is to further develop
the model presented, so new detection metrics can be
created for IDSs. Part of it will incorporate joint probability
distributions calculation, so the user can find a benchmark
of the successful injection given other events occurring
in the service. The authors would also like to be able to
model multiple communications channels in an instance, by
expanding the model to use M/M/c/K queues. The authors
are also expanding the queuing theory framework to model
other GOOSE message attacks. The next investigation is to
see if the GOOSE messaging service can be made to lose its
state.
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